We document several facts about workforce transitions from the informal to the formal sector in Vietnam, a fast growing, industrializing, and low-income country. First, younger workers, particularly migrants, are more likely to work in the formal sector and stay there permanently. Second, the decline in the aggregate share of informal employment occurs through changes between and within birth cohorts. Third, younger, educated, male, and urban workers are more likely to switch to the formal sector than other workers initially in the informal sector. Poorly educated, older, female, rural workers face little prospect of formalization. Fourth, formalization coincides with occupational upgrading.
We analyze data from the 1999 and 2009 Vietnam Population Censuses and the 2002 , 2004 , 2006 Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys (VHLSSs) focusing on workers ages 20-64. The data is nationally representative, covers all industries (including agriculture), and workers in formal and informal firms. An individual works in the informal sector if they are self-employed or works as an employee in the household business sector as opposed to the registered, enterprise sector. In Vietnam, state, foreign, and collective firms are legally required to register as an enterprise, whereas domestic private firms may legally operate as either an enterprise or a household business. Our definition closely corresponds to the notion of informality used in the literature (see La Porta and Shleifer 2014) . The VHLSSs contain a rotating panel subcomponent that tracks individuals over a period of up to four years. We therefore analyze transitions to the formal sector in a nationally representative setting and over a longer time frame than is usually feasible (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 2010 ). An online supplement provides further information on this data.
I. Formalization across and within birth cohorts
Workers of different ages differ in mobility costs (Dix-Carneiro 2014) , affecting their ability to transition to the formal sector as the economy grows. Age cohorts can shape the decline in aggregate informality through two channels. If the share of informal workers differs across birth cohorts, aggregate informality declines if cohorts entering the labor market have lower informality than existing and exiting cohorts. Additionally, workers within a given cohort may transition to the formal sector. We examine the role of birth cohorts in the aggregate decline in informality in Table 1 . Panel A reports the share of informal employment by five-year birth cohorts from the 1999 and 2009 censuses. Cohorts are based on age in 1999.
Young workers make a key contribution toward the aggregate decline in informality.
Young workers that enter the workforce between 1999 and 2009 (age 10-19 in 1999, then age 20-29 in 2009 ) are less likely to work informally than older, exiting cohorts (ages [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] in 1999. The informality among the entering cohorts is about 70 percent (column 2), compared to over 90 percent among the exiting cohorts (column 1). This highlights the importance of young cohorts for declines in informality through workforce shifts across cohorts. In addition, younger cohorts experience greater declines in within-cohort informality than older cohorts. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that reductions in informality are largest for the youngest cohorts and decline with age. Cohorts age 20-24 and 25-29 in 1999 experience an 11.2 and 4.7 percentage point drop in the share of informal employment by 2009, respectively, while workers in cohorts over age 40 either observe no change or gain employment in informal sector.
Over the decade, manufacturing employment expanded from 8.9 to 13.7 percent of the workforce, accompanied by a 14.5 percentage point drop in informality in that sector. As noted in Table 1 , young cohorts contribute even more significantly toward reductions in informality within manufacturing than they do economy-wide. In manufacturing, the gap in informality between entering young cohorts and existing cohorts is more pronounced and younger cohorts experience a greater decline in informality relative to older cohorts over time. Analysis by gender yields similar findings, although the gaps in informality across cohorts are larger for women and the within-cohort changes in informality are larger for men (see Table A4 in supplement).
When formal manufacturing jobs are spatially concentrated, transitions to the formal sector in a low-income country in part occur through migration (Harris and Todaro 1970) . In Vietnam in 1999, five provinces accounted for 63 percent of formal manufacturing employment.
We define migration as moving across provinces within the past five years, using the censuses (see Table A5 in supplement). 4.6 percent of workers in 2009 migrated, 66 percent of them to the five key provinces. Migration significantly increases over the decade of growth, particularly for the youngest cohort, from 5.6 to 11.6 percent. Migration declines with age. Importantly, migrants are much less likely to work informally. For example, in 2009, 72 percent of the workers in the youngest cohort were employed in the informal sector (Table 1 ) compared to only 32 percent of migrants in this cohort. Migration among the young and lower informality among the migrants are even more prevalent for manufacturing workers and women (see Table A6 in supplement).
This analysis suggests that younger workers in part formalize more quickly because they are more likely to migrate.
Overall, the between and within cohort shifts in informality contribute importantly toward economy-wide formalization. Panel B of Table 1 suggests that workforce shifts between cohorts account for 69 percent of the decline in aggregate informality, while within cohort changes account for 31 percent. The between cohort changes dominate in manufacturing, accounting for 90 percent of the decline in informality (particularly among women, see Table A4 in supplement).
1 These differences in the relative role of between and within cohort shifts highlight the importance of analysis based on all industries to understand the trends in informality in a low-income industrializing country.
II. Switchers, sorting and formalization
Section I highlights differences in formalization of the labor force across and within birth cohorts in a low-income country over a decade of fast growth. Using the VHLSS panels, which track individuals over a period of four years, we illustrate how workers actually transition to the 1 In contrast to the sharp decline in manufacturing, informality within services remained relatively constant (see Table A3 in supplement). Future research could explore possible reasons, including the role of government policies, firm organization, and FDI, for these different trends.
formal sector within birth cohorts. We examine the permanence of switches to the formal sector over a longer time period than is usually possible, and examine whether and how workers sort between the formal and informal sectors in a low-income country.
We first document individual transition patterns for various age cohorts. Table 2 reports the share of workers in each age cohort that always hold an informal job, always hold a formal job, or switch between the two sectors using the three-survey panels covering 2002 to 2008.
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Most workers are always in either the informal or formal sector. However, workers in younger cohorts are less likely to always be in the informal sector, more likely to always be in the formal sector and more likely to switch sectors. In addition, among the switchers, younger cohorts are more likely to hold a formal job at the end of the period. Younger cohorts also experience greater increases in the share that end up holding a formal job. In contrast, switching workers in older cohorts tend to end up working in an informal job. Younger switchers also more permanently transition to the formal sector: they are more likely to stay in the formal sector two to four years following the switch.
The differences in switching behavior of workers across age cohorts in part reflect disparities in other worker characteristics, such as education. The literature (Maloney 2004; de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 2010; La Porta and Shleifer 2014) emphasizes sorting of individuals into the formal and informal sector by education, consistent with theory (Lucas 1978; Rauch 1991) . We also find evidence consistent with sorting based on education by relying on the usual cross-sectional analysis: formal workers are more likely better educated, younger, male, non-minorities, and urban than workers in the informal sector (see Table A7 in supplement). We provide further evidence on sorting in transitions out of informality with panel-level data. If workers sort, the characteristics of workers in the formal sector are expected to be closer to thecharacteristics of workers that switch from informal to formal sector than to those of workers that remain in the informal sector. We limit the VHLSS panel sample to workers that are initially informal and regress an indicator for whether a worker switches to the formal sector by the end of the panel on a vector of worker characteristics.
The results are reported in Table 3 and support sorting into the formal sector as the workers that switch tend to be more educated, younger, male, non-minorities, and urban. This implies that relative to workers that remain in the informal sector, workers that switch out of informality tend to have more similar observable characteristics to workers already in the formal sector. We find further support for sorting in switching of individuals from the formal to the informal sector (see Table A8 in supplement). Relative to workers that remain in the formal sector, workers that switch to the informal sector tend to have more similar education, age, and residence to workers already working in the informal sector. However, women are less likely to switch to the informal sector, even though women are more likely to work in the informal sector.
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These findings imply that informal workers that are most likely to move to the formal sector in a fast-growing low-income economy possess characteristics that most closely resemble those of workers already in the formal sector. Poorly educated, older, rural, female workers are unlikely to make such transitions. Importantly, even among the workers most likely to switch out of the informal sector (completed upper secondary school, young, urban, and male), actual switching is subject to a large amount of unobserved heterogeneity: the R 2 is 0.06. Thus, many of the workers that were the "most likely switchers" did not switch to formal sector. However, the analysis excludes migrants, who are more likely to formalize (section II). To the extent that worker characteristics affect geographic mobility, the above analysis does not capture their influence on switching to the formal sector through migration. In addition, future work should also explore the role of labor demand factors on switching behavior.
V. Formalization and occupational upgrading
The literature suggests that few informal firms transition to the formal sector (de Mel, We group workers from two three-round panels of the VHLSSs into workers that are always in the informal sector, always in the formal sector, and switchers. For each of the groups, we report the share of employment in each occupation category at the beginning of the period and the change over the period in Table 4 . The occupations are in ascending order of mean monthly compensation. The composition of occupations significantly differs across these worker groups. Elementary occupations account for 85 percent of employment among informal workers, 67 percent among switchers, and 11 percent among formal workers. Switchers and formal workers have similar shares of employment in skilled occupations, but formal workers have notably higher shares of employment among higher-skilled occupations such as assemblers, machinists and professionals.
Importantly, switchers upgrade occupations. They tend to switch out of elementary toward skilled and professional occupations. The share of elementary occupations declines for all workers, but this decline is largest among the switchers. Switchers increase employment in skilled occupations (e.g. skilled handicraftsman and manual workers, skilled service workers), as well as in the assemblers, machinists and professional occupations, all occupations associated with higher pay than elementary occupations. This analysis follows the same individuals over time, so occupation upgrading does not reflect changes in underlying workforce composition.
Similar analysis of workers that move provides further support for occupation upgrading (see Table A9 in supplement).
Wage-earning informal workers receive lower wages and benefits than observationally equivalent formal workers, and households headed by an informal worker have lower per capita income than observationally equivalent households with a formal head (McCaig and Pavcnik 2014) . The analysis of occupational upgrading sheds further light on changes in working conditions associated with formalization in a low-income country. While many workers switch to lower-skilled manufacturing jobs in the formal sector, these jobs offer higher-skilled occupations and higher compensation than jobs previously held by these workers in agriculture and in informal manufacturing.
VI. Concluding Remarks
Our study highlights how one can use census and panel-level data to document facts about workforce transitions from the informal to the formal sector in a fast-growing, industrializing, low-income country over a longer time horizon. At an aggregate level, the transition to the formal sector in Vietnam appears faster than in other countries (La Porta and The sample of manufacturing workers is defined based on working in manufacturing at either the start or the end of the period. A worker is defined as permanently moving to the formal sector if they were initially working in the informal sector and subsequently working in the formal sector in the surveys 2 and 4 years later. The sample is all 2-survey panel individuals that worked in both surveys and were 20-64 years old and informal at the start of the panel. The regression also includes occupation, province, industry, and survey-year fixed effects. *** Significant at the 1 percent level ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. respectively were still attending school based on census estimates. , and wages and other benefits. We focus our analysis on the most timeconsuming job. As is the case with the census data, our analysis of working in the informal sector focuses on being self-employed or working for a household business or farm as opposed to working in the registered, enterprise sector. 4 We focus on workers ages 20-64 including individuals that may be working part time.
Table A2 displays summary statistics for the four surveys pooled together. We present three samples: all workers, informal workers, and formal workers. Table A4 provides supplementary material on the role of birth cohorts in the aggregate decline in informality shown in Table 1 in the main text. Table A4 examines the role of birth cohorts in the decline in aggregate share of informal employment by gender. Overall, men and women exhibit similar informality rates, but this masks gender differences in informality within birth cohorts. The share of informal employment is lower among younger women than among younger men, but higher among older women than older men. Within manufacturing, women are less likely to work in the informal sector than women, and this mainly reflects lower share of informal employment among younger women relative to younger men.
Supplementary Results

Supplementary Material for Introduction
Supplementary material for section II
The analysis in Table A4 confirms the economy-wide and manufacturing trends highlighted in the main text. However, there are some interesting differences across gender. In particular, the differences in informality across cohorts are larger for women than for men.
However, the within cohort declines in informality are larger for men than for women. Panel B
of Table A4 reports the decomposition of the aggregate decline in informality into the between and within cohort change and confirms the gender differences in the relative contribution of the two channels. Within cohort changes contributed 53 percent toward the economy-wide decline in the share of informal employment for men. In contrast, within cohort changes contribute only 7 percent toward the economy-wide decline in the share of informal employment for women, with workforce shifts across cohorts accounting for the vast majority of the informality decline among women. As is the case with the pooled sample, workforce shifts between cohorts play a more important role in declines in informal employment in manufacturing, particularly among women.
This likely reflects the large young cohort of women that enters the labor force with very low rates of informality. Table A5 reports the share of workers that migrate and the share of informal employment among these workers by birth cohort. Overall, 4.6 percent of workers in 2009 migrate, but 66 percent of them reside in the five key provinces. Migration significantly increases over the decade of growth, particularly for the youngest cohort, from 5.6 percent to 11.6 percent.
However, migration is less prevalent with age. Importantly, within each cohort, migrants are much less likely to work informally. For example, in 2009, 72 percent of the workers in the youngest cohort are employed in the informal sector (Table 1) , as compared to only 32 percent of migrants in this cohort (Table A5) . Table A6 reports the migration analysis by gender. This analysis confirms the trends in the economy-wide and manufacturing samples and does not suggest large differences in migration rates between men and women that work. However, women migrants are less likely to work in the informal sector than men, driven by substantially lower informality rates among young migrant women in manufacturing.
Supplementary material for section III
This section briefly summarizes the evidence consistent with sorting of individuals into the formal and informal sectors. It examines worker characteristics that are associated with a greater probability of working in the informal sector using cross-sectional data, a common approach in the literature. In particular, we regress the indicator for whether an individual works in the informal sector on age cohort indicators (25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64 (20-24 is the excluded category)), a female indicator, an ethnic minority indicator, education indicators (complete primary, complete lower secondary, complete upper secondary (no completed schooling is the excluded category)), an indicator for whether the individual lives in urban area, and occupation, industry, province, and year fixed effects. Table A7 reports the results in column 1. We find evidence of sorting of workers into the formal and informal sector based on education. Workers in the formal sector tend to be better educated than otherwise observationally equivalent workers in the informal sector. They are also more likely to be younger, male, and to reside in urban areas than workers in the informal sector. The analysis that focuses on manufacturing (column 2) and the five key provinces (column 3) yields similar conclusions. The one exception is the role of gender. Within manufacturing, women are less likely to work in the informal sector relative to observationally equivalent men. In the five key provinces, women are also less likely to work in the informal sector than men, likely due to high concentration of manufacturing in these areas.
We complement the analysis of sorting based on switchers from informal to formal sector from the main text (Table 3) by examining sorting in switching of individuals from the formal to the informal sector. We confine the sample to all workers in the panel that initially work in the formal sector and use an indicator for whether a worker works in the informal sector at the end of the panel as the dependent variable. The results reported in column 1 of Table A8 suggest that switching to the informal sector is more predictable (R 2 of 0.27) than switching to the formal sector (see Table 3 in main text) and supports sorting by education, age, and residence. Less educated, older, and rural workers are more likely to switch to the informal sector. Relative to workers that remain in the formal sector, workers that switch to the informal sector tend to have more similar education, age, and residence to workers already working in the informal sector.
However, women are less likely to switch to the informal sector, even though women are more likely to work in the informal sector.
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Supplementary material for section IV Table A9 provides further support for occupation upgrading by focusing on workers that move. The sample is based on workers from the household surveys that left the household and reported leaving for work reasons. This information is available in the 2006 and 2008 VHLSSs.
Recall from section I that migration is associated with a higher degree of formalization. The occupational structure after the move shifted away from elementary occupations toward skilled occupations (especially skilled handicrafts and manual occupations), assemblers, machinists, staff, and professionals relative to the start of the sample. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is all 2--survey panel individuals that worked in both surveys and were 20--64 years old and formal at the start of the panel. The regression also includes occupation, province, industry, and survey--year fixed effects. 
